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Three decades ago I published an article, based mainly on research in
published primary sources, arguing that eighteenth-century American juries
had the right to decide law as well as fact in the cases, both civil and criminal,
that came before them.' I am now in the middle of a decade-long project of
examining nearly all extant manuscript sources for colonial American law.2 On
the basis of the material I have studied so far, I already know that the story of
the jury's power is far more complex than I had thought before.
If the question is simply whether colonial juries had power to find law, the
answer is sometimes yes and sometimes no. In New England, I remain
convinced that the answer is mainly yes. In Virginia, where I have yet to
research eighteenth-century manuscript sources, published sources suggest that
the answer is yes. But in other major colonies-New York, Pennsylvania, and
both Carolinas-the answer is no.
But that simple question is the wrong one. We care about jury power
because it serves as a proxy for a more important issue-the issue of how
much power local communities enjoy to live by their own law rather than the
law of some central authority. When appellate judges determine what is law
and trial judges possess power to take a case from a jury if the jury does not
follow their instructions on that law, then central bureaucrats or polity-wide
majorities will possess ultimate governance authority. When juries, in contrast,
* Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law, New York University. The author is indebted
to the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund of New York
University School of Law for research support.
ISee William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REv. 893, 904-17 (1978).
2 The first volume growing out of the project was published in 2008. See WILLIM[ E.
NELsoN, THE COMMON LAW iN COLONIAL AMERiCA, VOLUME 1: THE CHEsAPEAKE AND
NEW ENGLAND, 1607-1660 (2008).
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determine the law, ultimate power remains in the local communities from
which the juries are drawn.
Accordingly, the right question to ask when we inquire into how law was
made in colonial courts is this: was law under the control of local communities,
or did law represent the enforceable will of central political authorities? This
Article represents a preliminary attempt, based on the research I have
completed so far, to provide the broad outlines of a very complex answer to
this question. It will proceed on a colony-by-colony basis, turning first to New
England and Virginia, where juries and, hence, local commnunities possessed
the power to determine the law, and then to Pennsylvania, where they did not.
Finally, it will examine New York and the Carolinas, where the lawfinding
power of juries was under a greater degree of judicial control but central
political authorities nonetheless could not impose their will on localities.
I. NEW ENGLAND
In Massachusetts, the answer is clear-in the decades prior to the
American Revolution, juries and, hence, local communities had final power to
determine the law.3 Few in eighteenth-century Massachusetts would have
disagreed with the sentiments of the Middlesex County Convention when in
1774 it observed that "no state can long exist free and happy ... when trials by
juries ... [are] destroyed or weakened."14 For, as John Adams explained, the
jury system introduced into the "executive branch ... a mixture of popular
power"; as a result, "the subject [was] guarded in the execution of the laws," 5
and "no man [could] be condemned of life, or limb, or property, or reputation,
without the concurrence of the voice of the people."6
As a result of such sentiments, none of the devices available at common
law to control jury lawfinding were used in Massachusetts. Special pleading
beyond the initial plea by. the defendant and replication by the plaintiff was
rare, and most cases were tried under the general issue.7 A second device for
controlling juries-judicial instructions on the law-was ineffective. In many
civil cases no instructions were given at all, and even in those cases where the
3 See WiLLiAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAw: THiE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 20-35 (1975) [hereinafter
NELSON, AmERicANizATioN].
4 Resolves of Middlesex County Convention, August 1774, in LEMUEL SHATrucK, A
HISTORY OF THE TOWN OF CONCORD 84 (183 5).
5 3 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 481 (Charles F. Adams ed., 185 1).
6 2 JOHN ADAms, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 253 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1850).
7 See NELSON, AMRCANIZATION, supra note 3, at 23.
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jury was charged, the charges were often brief and rudimentary.8 Detailed
charges were often unnecessary because the courts could and did assume that
the "general Rules of Law and common Regulations of Society, under which
ordinary Transactions arrange~d] themselves, [were] well enough known to
ordinary Jurors." 9 "A further reason for the ineffectiveness of instructions was
that they were often contradictory."'1 0 One source of contradiction was counsel,
"who on summation could argue the law as well as the facts." 1' "Most
confusing of all was the court's seriatim charge; each judge sitting on the
multi-member panel that tried every case gave his own statement of the law-a
statement that could and sometimes did differ from the statements of his
brethren."' 2 Most important, post-verdict motions in arrest of judgment and
motions for a new trial on the ground that a jury verdict was contrary to the
law or the evidence were never granted. 13
The power of juries over the legal aspects of cases was therefore great. In
the words of John Adams, "a general Verdict ... assuredly determine[d] ...
the Law," for it was "not only [every juror's] right but his Duty in that Case to
find the Verdict according to his own best Understanding, Judgment and
Conscience, tho in Direct opposition to the Direction of the Court."'14
The power of Massachusetts juries to determine law dated back to the
1670s. Prior to then, conflicts between jurors and magistrates had been referred
to the General Court, which after 1649 sat as a single body when hearing
judicial matters.15 As a result, the deputies in the lower house, which
represented local communities, had the controlling voice, since they
outnumbered the magistrates in the upper house by about three to one. 16 "This
triumph of local community power never would be effectively challenged
thereafter" in colonial Massachusetts.'17
But the manmer in which local power functioned in the judicial process
would be questioned. In the late 1 660s, a dispute lasting five years developed
8 Id at 26.
9 1 JOHN ADAMS, LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B.
Zobel eds., 1965).
10 NEIsoN, AMERCANIzATION, supra note 3, at 26.
11 Id
12 Id.
13 Id. at 26-2 8.
14 1 ADAMS, supra note 9, at 230.
15 See William E. Nelson, The Utopian Legal Order of the Massachusetts Bay Colony,
1630-1686, 47 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 183, 198-200 (2005) [hereinafter Nelson, Utopian
Legal Order].
16 Id at 200.
17 Id
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over the oaths that the members of each house should take when sitting as
judges.' 8 The clergy was called in to arbitrate the dispute, and in 1672 it
proposed repeal of the legislation authorizing the General Court to review
judge-jury conflicts. In its place the ministers recommended:
[T]he magistrates may be, by expresse law, directed to accept the juries verdict
and to grant judgment accordingly, unlesse they shall judge the juries verdict
to be evidently contrary to law and evidence, in which case they may bee
empowered by law to cause the junie to answer for their default, in the same
court before a jury of twenty four persons chosen by the freemen, or otherwise
to bee liable to bee served by the party aggrieved With a writ of attainder out of
the same court. 19
The General Court agreed. In 1672 it "enacted an elaborate statute in general
conformity to" this recommendation, abolished appeals to the General Court in
cases of bench-jury disagreement, and required trial judges to accept all jury
verdicts, subject only to the cumbersome procedure of attaint. 20
Since attaint juries usually sustained the verdicts of trial juries, the attaint
process atrophied over time, and trial juries were left with ultimate power to
find law.21 "The presence of ultimate power in juries does not mean, however,
that they used their power with any frequency in a fashion adverse to the
wishes of the bench Most of the time juries acted with self-restraint and
cooperated with the judges."22
Even when the bench and jury seemed at loggerheads, they may, in fact,
not have been. Consider, for example, a case brought by Edward Randolph, the
collector of customs for the Crown in the late 1 670s and early 1 680s, against
George Hutchinson, a merchant whom Randolph accused of smuggling.23
Randolph was not a popular man in Massachusetts Bay,24 and not surprisingly,
18 Mark DeWolfe Howe & Louis F. Eaton, Jr., The Supreme Judicial Power in the
Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 20 NEW ENGLAND Q. 291, 306-11 (1947).
19I.at 311 (citing 2 THOMAS HurtCI-NsoN, LEGAL PAPERS OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON
169 (Boston, 1865)) (quoting the recommendation of the clergy).
2 0 Id. at 312; see Nelson, Utopian Legal Order, supra note 15, at 200-0 1.
21 See Nelson, Utopian Legal Order, supra note 15, at 201-02.
22 Id. at 202-03.
23 See Randolph v. Hutchinson, (Ct. Asst. 1680), in 1 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF
ASSISTANTS OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETrs BAY, 1630-1692, at 168 (1901).
24 His unpopularity resulted both from his efforts to undermine the government of the
Bay Colony and to secure revocation of its charter and from his efforts at revenue collection.
See FRANCIS J. BREMER, THE PURITAN ExPERIMENT: NEW ENGLAND SOCIETY FROM
BRADFORD To EDWARDS 172-73 (rev. ed. 1995).
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the jury returned a verdict for Hutchinson.25 Then "IWthe Court sent out the
Jury once & Againe wh the Case fuirther to Consider of it. [A]t their Coming in
Againe they declared by their foreman they saw no cause to Alter their verdict
. . .. "126 By so asking the jury to reconsider its verdict, the court performed its
duty of supporting royal authority, and by adhering to its verdict, the jury did
what the court probably wanted but lacked power to do--it undermined royal
government. At least as it functioned in Randolph's case, the 1672 legislation
thus appears to have been an effort to conceal local community power from
royal scrutiny: it transferred the power from the General Court, where royal
officials could observe its exercise, to the jury room, where local people,
sitting behind closed doors, could obstruct royal policy at will.
Although I have not yet fully researched Connecticut, I believe that its
eighteenth-century juries, like those in Massachusetts, possessed power to
determine law as well as fact. I am uncertain about New Hampshire27 and
Rhode Island. But Rhode Island, as well as Connecticut, had an elected
governor and judges responsive to the electorate;28 Rhode island also was a
tiny colony where, because of its size, everything was local. Accordingly, I
remain reasonably confident asserting that localities determined the substance
of law in most of New England.
Erving v. Cradock,29 a 1761 case from Massachusetts, illustrates like the
earlier case of Randolph v. Hutchinson why local control of the law mattered.
The case arose when a Massachusetts shipowner brought a writ of trespass
against a royal revenue officer who had seized his vessel for smuggling and
25 Randolph v. Hutchinson, (Ct. Asst. 1680), in 1 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF
ASSISTANTS OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, 1630-1692, 168 (1901).
26 Id
27 SeJOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY
NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 108, 115-22 (2004) (assuming that colonial juries had power to
find both law and fact; he is clear that juries in the early republic possessed both powers). It
also is clear that New Hampshire followed Massachusetts procedure into the 1670s. See
ELWIN L. PAGE, JUDICIAL BEGINMNGs IN NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1640-1700, at 89-90 (1959).
But see id. at 91, which cites a 1763 case setting aside a verdict as contrary to law and
evidence.
28 See CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS of 1663,
reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, ANDi COLONIES Now OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3214 (Francis Newton Thorpe
ed., 1906); CONNECTICUT COLONY CHARTER of 1662, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTrrUTIONS, COLONIL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
UNrrED STATES 253 (Benjamin Perley Poore ed., 1878).
29 QUINCY'S REPORTS 553 (1761).
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then had it condemned in admiralty. 30 All five judges of the Superior Court
instructed the jury that the admiralty decree was res judicata and a bar to the
trespass suit, but the jury ignored their instructions and returned a substantial
verdict for the shipowner.3 ' Both the court and the colonial administration
nonetheless understood that the verdict was binding, even though its effect was
to obstruct enforcement of Parliament's Navigation Acts. Law in New England
was what local people, not Parliament, declared.
HI. VIRGINIA
Let me now turn south to more complex law. As to New Jersey, Delaware,
Maryland, and Georgia, the incompleteness of my research precludes my
saying anything. But Virginia is too important to ignore, even though I have
not yet researched the eighteenth-century manuscript sources and cannot add to
what I wrote thirty years ago. At that point, my authority was none other than
Thomas Jefferson, who wrote in 1781-82 in Notes on Virginia that, although
juries typically decided only the facts and took their law from the court, "this
division of the subject lies with their discretion only. And if the question relate
to any point of public liberty, or if it be one of those in which the judges may
be suspected of bias, the jury undertake to decide both law and fact."132 In
short, Virginia juries, according to Jefferson, who was surely a knowledgeable
observer, possessed plenary lawfinding power if they chose to exercise it.33
Ull. PENNSYLVANIA
Strangely, Pennsylvania is the polar opposite of New England and
Virginia. I say strangely because the leading seventeenth-century English
precedent on jury power was Bushell's Case, decided in 1 670.34 That
precedent probably influenced Massachusetts to enact its 1672 legislation
requiring judges to accept jury verdicts even if the judges thought the jury had
30 Id.
31 Id at 556.
3 2 THoms JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINI 140 (J. W. Randolph ed.,
1953).
33 See William E. Nelson, The Province of the Judiciary, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
325, 342-43 (2004) [hereinafter Nelson, Province of the Judiciary]; A.G. ROEBER,
FArrHFuL MAGISTRATES ANqD REPuBLICAN LAwyERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINI LEGAL
CULTURE, 1680-18 10, at 216 (198 1) (seeing a departure after 1800 from the colonial
"idea that law ought to be concerned with investigating and enforcing the moral
standards of a local community whose interests were homogeneous").
34 Bushell's Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006.
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gotten the law wrong.35 And Bushell's Case was known intimately to
Pennsylvanians.
The case arose when a London jury ignored judicial instructions and
acquitted William Penn of a charge of sedition growing out of his Quaker
beliefs.36 The judge then imprisoned Bushell, the jury's foreman, for contempt,
but Bushell sought a writ of habeas corpus, and the Chief Judge of Common
Pleas granted the writ, holding that a juror could not be imprisoned for
following his conscience in giving a verdict, even if that meant ignoring
judicial instructions on the law.37 For the next century, Bushell 's Case was a
leading constitutional authority, standing for the proposition that juries had the
right to determine both law and fact in the cases they heard, even in opposition
to judicial instructions.
A number of early Pennsylvania Quakers defended that right. One
interesting case occurred when James Keith, a renowned preacher who had
arrived in Philadelphia in 1689, wrote a pamphlet about some pirates who had
stolen a vessel from a wharf and began an escape.38 Three Quaker magistrates
immediately issued a warrant for the pirates' capture, a prominent Quaker
merchant offered a reward of £100, and a party of men acting under the
warrant forcibly overtook and seized the pirates and received the reward.39
Keith questioned whether "hir[ing] men to fight, (and giving them a
Commission so to do, signed by three Justices of the Peace called QuakersD]"'
was consistent with Quaker principles of pacifism.40 The pamphlet was
published by the only printer in Philadelphia, William Bradford.4'
Bradford was then indicted for publishing a seditious attack on the
magistrates.42 The main issue in the case was who would determine whether or
not the publication was seditious. The position of the prosecution was that the
jury should find only whether Bradford had printed the pamphlet, while the
court should determine whether it was seditious.43 Bradford, in contrast,
argued that the jury should have broad power "to find also whether this be a
Seditious Paper or not and whether it ... tend[s] to the weakening of the hands
35 See Nelson, Utopian Legal Order, supra note 15, at 201.
36 Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1006.
3 7 Id at 1 009_1 0.
38 Proprietor v. Keith, (Philadelphia County Quarter Sessions 1686), in SAMUEL W.
PENNYPACKER'S COLONIAL. CASES 117, 130 (1892) [hereinafter PENNYPACKER's COLONIAL
CASES].
39 1Id. at 130.
4 0 Id. at 13 1.
41 Id at 130.
4 2 Id at 132.
43 Proprietor v. Keith, in PENNYPACKER'S COLONIAL CASES, supra note 38, at 135.
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of the Magistrate.""4 Some jurors also "believe[d] in their Consciences they
were obliged to try whether th[e] Paper was Seditious" 45 and Samuel Jennings
for the court so instructed them. 46 The case was never resolved, however,
when the jury proved unable after two days of deliberation to agree on a
verdict'4 7
No other judge in colonial Pennsylvania ever conceded such broad power
to juries as did Jennings. But other Pennsylvanians thought juries should
possess it. In 1686, for example, the colonial assembly seemingly objected to
county courts serving as 'judges of equity as well as law .. , to mitigate, alter,
or reverse" the verdict of a jury,4 8 while a Philadelphia grand jury indicted a
justice of the peace "for menacing and abusing ye jurors in the triall" of a
named individual, "which was an Infringement of ye rights and properties of
ye people." 49
The Pennsylvania assembly similarly impeached Chief Justice Nicholas
Moore when he refuised to accept a compromise verdict for a plaintiff in the
amount of £8 in a suit in which the declaration had sought £500.50 Moore told
the jury to "goe out and find according to Evidence or Else you are all perjured
Persons," and the jury did so and brought in a new verdict, this time for the
defendant.5 ' In the assembly's view, Moore had "refuse[d] a verdict brought in
by a Lawfull Jury and by Divers threats & Menaces and Threatening ye jury
with ye crime of Perjury and (confiscation) of their Estates forced ye said Jury
to goe out so often until they had brought a Direct Contrary Verdict to the
first."15 2 The council, however, at a time when William Penn was in town,
refused to convict Moore, who therefore retained his position of Chief Justice
as well as the confidence of Penn.53
This decision of the council, as I see it, indicates that the Quaker
leadership of Pennsylvania fully understood the significance of Bushell 's
441Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 138.
47'~ See id at 139.
4 8 THE REGISTRAR'S BOOK OF GOVRNuOR KEITH'S COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE
PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1720-1735, at 75 (1941) [hereinafter THE REGISTRAR'S
BOOK].
49 Presentment of the Grand Jury, (Philadelphia County Quarter Sessions 1686), in
PENNYPACKER'S COLONIAL CASES, supra note 38, at 116-17.
50 Proprietor v. Moore, (Pa. Leg. 1685), in PENNYPACKER'S COLONIAL CASES, supra
note 38, at 46.
5' Id.
52 Id. at 4 1.
53 Id. at 48.
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Case-that it was all about power. The new colony's leaders, who assumed
correctly that non-Quakers someday would constitute a majority of
Pennsylvania's people, planned to remain in control; to guarantee their control,
they adopted rules of procedure insuring that judges, who served at the
pleasure of the Quaker proprietor, rather than juries responsive to popular will,
would control the law and the judicial process. In subsequent years, the
leadership developed a changing variety of techniques to keep juries under
control.
In one case, for example, in which jurors were having difficulty reaching a
verdict and agreed to resolve the case by casting lots, the court held the verdict
defective, set it aside, and required the jurors to "give[] satisfaction both to the
plaintiff and defendant and parties concerned" so that "they were no way hurt
or damnified by the said verdict;" in addition, the jurors and the constable who
aided them were collectively fined some E5O.54 As I have reported elsewhere,
other courts in Philadelphia, Chester, and Lancaster counties similarly granted
motions in arrest of judgment, set aside judgments and verdicts, and also
ordered new trials.55
What apparently became the favored mode of jury control in the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth century was recourse to equity. We have
already seen the concern of the Pennsylvania assembly that equity courts could
"mitigate, alter, or reverse" jury verdicts.56 In one case about which we know
most, a suit for breach of a contract to survey lands where the plaintiff had
made partial payment, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant even though
the evidence showed he had not completed the survey work.57 The plaintiff
wanted the verdict set aside "becaus of the severitie of ye Comon law allowing
him no Consideracon for ye money paid, which he doubts not but equitie will
allow."58 Unfortunately, the outcome of this invocation of equity has not been
preserved. In other cases, however, "it is possible to determine that defendants
did turn successfully to equity to reduce the penalties juries had awarded in
suits for breach of penal bonds," or to otherwise set aside verdicts of juries that
54 See White v. Altman, (Bucks County Quarter Sessions Dec. 1698), in Records of the
Courts of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania 1684-1700,
at 358-60 (Triane Publ'g County 1943).
55 See William E. Nelson, Government by Judiciary: The Growth of Judicial Power in
Colonial Pennsylvania, 59 SMU L. Rnv. 3, 19-20 (2006) [hereinafter Nelson, Government
by Judiciary].
56 THE REGISTRAR'S BooK, supra note 48, at 75.
57 Jones v. Ascom, (Pa. Provincial Ct. 1686), in PENNYPACKER'S COLONLI CASES,
supra note 38, at Ill1.
58 Id.
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had been obtained only one or two days earlier.59
Pennsylvania's separate court of equity ceased to function, however, after
1735, as a result of a dispute between the governor and the provincial assembly
over who had power to establish it, and the end of a separate chancery court
put an end to the use of appeals to equity as a mechanism for jury control.60
But a new device, the demurrer to the evidence, which already was in use in
neighboring New York, 6' promptly appeared in Pennsylvania.
Kuhn v. Hart, a 1752 case from Lancaster County, 62 with its ethnically
mixed population of English and German settlers, is characteristic. The town
of Lancaster had set up a lottery to raise money for purchasing a fire engine
and had appointed Adam Kuhn and John Hart as the lottery's managers. After
the drawing, the winners went to Hart to collect their winnings, but he refused
to pay; they then presented their winning tickets to Kuhn, who did pay and
who then brought an action on the case against Hart for reimbursement. 63 At
the close of the plaintiff's case, in which Kuhn had presented evidence to this
effect, defendant demurred.64 Hart's counsel, in language important enough to
be quoted at length, pleaded
that the evidence and allegations aforesaid alleged were not sufficient in law to
maintain the issue joined for the plaintiff, to which the defendant need not nor
by the law of the land is bound to give any answer. Wherefore for want of
sufficient evidence in this behalf, the defendant demands judgment, that the
jurors aforesaid of giving their verdict be discharged, & that the plaintiff be
barred from having a verdict. 65
In response to this attempt to override the jury's power, the plaintiff declared
"that he had given sufficient matter in evidence, to which the defendant has
59 See Nelson, Government by Judiciary, supra note 55, at 20.
60 See THE REGISTRAR'S BOOK, supra note 48, at 76-77. The court had been created in
1720. See id. The best discussion of the history of the court is in Stanley N. Katz, The
Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law
in the Eighteenth Century, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERJCAN HISTORY 255, 266-71 (Donald
Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 197 1).
61 For, an example in print of a demurrer to the evidence, as used in New York, see
Clarkson v. Elphinston (1729), in SELECT CASES IN THE MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK
CrrY, 1674-1784, at 217 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1935) [hereinafter SELECT CASES].
62 Kuhn v. Hart, (Lancaster County Ct. Corn. P1. Nov. 1752) (on file with Lancaster
County Historical Society).
63 Id
64 Id.
65 Id.
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given no answer," and that the case therefore should go to the july 66 Although
the parties settled the case before the court could resolve the demurrer,67
demurrers to the evidence raising substantive legal issues that the demurrants
wanted the court rather than the jury to decide began to appear "with some
frequency thereafter." 68
At the same time as the demurrer to the evidence was blossoming, other
lawyers, perhaps with less sophistication, were striving to develop analogous
procedures. Over time, some of these emerged as full-fledged mechanisms for
controlling jury discretion and hence reigning in the power of local
communities. Indeed, by the mid-1770s, demurrers were coming to be
"disused"69 and replaced by these other mechanisms.
Just as the Pennsylvania Court of Equity was closing down, a jury in
Lancaster County returned a plaintiff's verdict. The defendant's lawyer moved
in arrest of judgment, perhaps on procedural or perhaps on substantive
grounds.70 The court's decision suggests, however, that the grounds were
substantive. 7' Because it viewed the argument in arrest of judgment and the
authorities quoted on behalf of the plaintiff as stronger than those produced by
the defendant, the court overruled the argument of the defendant and granted
judgment for the plaintiff.72
Eight years later in Chester County, "ambiguous motions challenged jury
verdicts in two separate actions."
In the one, after a verdict had been set aside on unspecified grounds, a second
jury found a new verdict; the losing party moved for yet another new trial, but
the court denied the motion. In the other, a defendant filed reasons to stay a
judgment based on a verdict for the plaintiff.73
Nine years after these challenges,
just as the Lancaster Court of Common Pleas was deciding Kuhn v. Hart,
another defense attorney in Lancaster moved for a new trial and a repleader
following a jury verdict for the plaintiff. No record remains of the grounds of
67Id
68 See Nelson, Government by Judiciary, supra note 55, at 22.
69 SeHurst v. Dippo, I U.S. (1 DalI.) 20-21 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1774).
70 See McCoan v. Morrough, (Lancaster County Ct. Coin. P1. Feb. 1735) (on file with
Lancaster County Historical Society).
71 See id
72 Id
73 Nelson, Government by Judiciary, supra note 55, at 22.
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the motion, but the fact that the lawyer requested a repleader along with a new
trial suggests that substance was at issue.74
Substance was clearly at issue in the 1763 Supreme Court case of Lessee
of Fothergill v. Stover,75 a suit over title to land. At trial, the court accepted the
defendant's offer of an informal letter from the secretary of the land office as
proof of his title, and the jury returned a defendant's verdict.7 6 The plaintiff,
contending that the letter did not suffice to confer title, thereupon filed a bill of
exceptions to the court's evidentiary ruling and took an appeal to the Privy
Council, which accordingly was forced to rule on the substantive issue of
whether the informal land grant procedures adopted in Pennsylvania following
William Penn's death sufficed to grant valid title.77 The use of this procedure
of a bill of exceptions, followed in local Pennsylvania practice by a writ of
error (rather than an appeal) to bring a case before a higher court, became
routine in colonial Pennsylvania in the decade prior to the American
Revolution.78
Whatever the ambiguities, it seems clear that by the 1 770s, Pennsylvania's
lawyers and judges had developed a number of mechanisms-the demurrer to
the evidence, the writ of error and the bill of exceptions, and, perhaps, the
motion in arrest of judgment-to deny lawfinding power to juries and place it
in the hands of the bench. As Chief Justice Benjamin Chew announced less
than two years before Americans declared their independence in Philadelphia,
"the law [was] not uncertain." It was "a settled rule, that courts of law
determine Law; a Jury Facts."79 "Upon which maxim," he added, "every
security depends in an English Country."180 As long as counsel took the
necessary steps to make it so, "the opinion of the Court" on points of law was
"4conclusive to the Jury."8 1
The Pennsylvania judiciary's control over the law was not without
opposition. One pamphleteer in 1772, for example, declared that, "if a Jury
will take upon them the knowledge of the law ... they may" and that the
judiciary's efforts to deny the jury its rightful power had transformed the jury
74 Id
75 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 6, 7 (1763).
76 Id
77 Id
78 See Nelson, Government by Judiciary, supra note 55, at 23-24.
79 Hurst v. Dippo, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 20,21 (1774).
80 Id
81 Anonymous, 1 U.S. (I DalI.) 20 (1773).
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into an "engine of oppression."82 And when, as a consequence of the
Revolution, the Quaker elite lost its power and radical democrats assumed
control in the new Commonwealth, juries may have received the right to
determine law as well as fact. 83
IV. NEW YoRK
Now let me turn to New York, where the Judicature Act of 1691,84 as
amended by the Judicature Act of 1692,85 which, in the main, continued in
force until the Revolution, 86 protected the role of juries by declaring explicitly
that only juries could determine matters of fact.87 Unfortunately, the act was
somewhat ambiguous in specifying the matters of fact to be left in the hands of
juries.88 How was one to distinguish matters of fact from mixed questions of
law and fact? Would a court be free, that is, to overturn a jury verdict resolving
the facts if the jury also had applied law to those facts contrary to what the
court thought the law ought to be?
In most cases before the 1730s, little conflict occurred between trial judges
and juries. Juries returned their verdicts, and judges typically and routinely
accepted them. If juries had doubt about the law, they could return a special
verdict, in which they found only the facts and left it to the court to apply the
law to the facts; juries returned special verdicts with some frequency. And
when conflicts arose in cases employing general verdicts, judges had several
procedural devices available at trial to keep control of the law in their hands
rather than the hands of the jury.
Thus, numerous post-verdict motions for new trials and in arrest of
judgment were granted, although the court records usually do not state the
82 The Englishman's Right: A Dialogue between a Barrister at Law and a Juryman,
THE PA. CHRoN., Feb. 3, 1772, at 22.
83 See Patrick Kehoe Spero, Creating Pennsylvania: The Politics of the Frontier and the
State, 1682-1800 (2009), at 340-65 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Pennsylvania) (on file with author). Beginning in 1805, Federalists and moderate
Jeffersonians began the process of recovering control of the law from juries. See Nelson,
Province of the Judiciary, supra note 3 3, at 342 (thereby suggesting that juries had gained
control over the law sometime after the Revolution).
84 1 THm COLONIAL. LAws OF NEW YORK 226 (1894).
8 5 Id. at 303.
86 After 1698, the validity of the court system rested on gubernatorial proclamation.
See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EmPIE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF CoNSTTruTioNALIsm IN THE ATLANTic WORLD, 1664-1830, at 54 (2005).
87 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, supra note 84, at 230.
88 Id
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legal grounds of those motions. At the other end of the litigation, defendants
could interpose a demurrer to a plaintiff's action, seeking its dismissal for lack
of legal merit even before it reached a jury; plaintiffs similarly could obtain
rulings on the legal sufficiency of defendants' defenses. 89
However, the demurrer to the evidence was the "most frequently used
jury-control device," and was used in New York some two decades before its
appearance in Pennsylvania."0
Trial judges thus possessed ample procedures with which to control
juries.9 ' It was unclear, however, whether they were prepared to use them.
Thus, one chief justice in an early eighteenth century case instructed a jury that
"if You will take upon you to judge of Law, you may, or bring in the fact
specially," 92 while three decades later another judge told a jury that the
evidence against defendants warranted a conviction "if you have no particular
reasons in your own breasts, in your own consciences to discredit [it] ."19 These
judges, and others as well, were quite willing to let juries determine the law.
As a result, it was unclear whether officials of the central administration in
New York City could rely on the power of trial judges in their effort to impose
imperial policies on the colony-whether the Crown, in short, could control
the outcome of cases in local trial courts.
The simplest form of control would have been the governor's appointment
and removal power, but by mid-century that power had atrophied. The removal
power arguably disappeared entirely after Governor Cosby discharged Chief
Justice Morris; the commission of Morris's successor, James DeLancey, and of
several other judges explicitly granted them tenure during good behavior,94
and all judges may have had such tenure by implication once DeLancey
obtained it. Moreover, the governor did not possess a free hand in the
appointment process. 95 By the mid-eighteenth century, he appointed judges at
89 William E. Nelson, Legal Turmoil in a Factious Colony: New York, 1664-1776, 38
HoFsTRA L. REv. 69, 129-31 (2009) [hereinafter Nelson, Legal Turmoil] .
90 See id. at 13 1. On occasion, trial courts engaged in even stronger, though quite
irregular, manhandling of juries, as, for example, by increasing a jury's damage or by setting
aside a jury verdict of not guilty in a criminal case. Id at 132.
91 See DEBORAH A. ROSEN, COURTS AND COMMERCE: GENDER, LAW, AND THE
MARKET ECONOMY IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 62-4, 1 g1 n.2 1 (1997).
92 See JULIUs GOEBEL, JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
CoLONiAL NEW YORK: A STUDY iN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664-1776), at 666 (1944)
(quoting Chief Justice Mompesson's charge in the Trial of Makemie).
93 See id at 667 (quoting Chief Justice Horsmanden's charge in the Trial of
Hughsons).
94~ See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 86, at 123-24.
95 Id. at 56, 120.
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the county level following nomination by the Assembly, which almost
certainly meant nomination by local assemblymen, and to the Supreme Court
only from members of the bar, nearly all of whom had enjoyed long careers in
New York practice. 96 The Assembly had even further influence over judges, in
that it controlled their remuneration.97 Another device used with some
frequency-proceedings against local judges and other officials for failure to
perform the duties of their office-superficially appears to have provided a
means of centralized control, but it was used only in cases of egregious
misconduct. 98
Therefore it became necessary to exercise control through the appeals
process-the process by which higher courts, mainly the Supreme Court but
ultimately the Governor and Council and the Privy Council, controlled lower
courts. If appellate courts sitting without juries could review the entirety of the
proceedings below, they would have even more power over jury verdicts than
trial judges. If, on the other hand, they could review only what was contained
in the record below, their power would be limited by the scope of that record.
Three writs existed for transferring cases from a lower to a higher court-
habeas corpus, certiorari, and error.99 In addition, transfer of criminal cases
could occur prior to verdict through more informal procedures.'100
Habeas corpus lay to transfer jurisdiction over a litigant from a lower to a
higher court at any time prior to final judgment. But it could only be used if
the lower court had sufficient control over the body of a litigant to deliver that
control to the higher court-that is, if a litigant was in custody or had given
bail to insure his or her appearance. That requirement somewhat limited the
utility of the writ to criminal cases and in civil actions instituted by capias
rather than attachment of property. in addition, habeas presented another
problem: it did not allow a litigant to seek victory in a lower court and appeal
only if he lost; he or she would have had to waive whatever opportunities the
lower court offered. Finally, since habeas was used invariably before juries
began deliberation, it could not serve as a device for controlling jury
lawflnding. 10 1
9 6 Id. at 127-29.
97I.at 56, 120, 122-29; Eben Moglen, Settling the Law: Legal Development in New
York, 1664-1776, at 217-22, 228-35 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University); see also Richard B. Morris, Introduction, in SELECT CASES, supra note 61, at
52-57.
98 See Nelson, Legal Turmnoil, supra note 89, at 133-34.
99 See MOGLEN, supra note 97, at 182-84.
00I.at 183-84.
10 1 Nelson, Legal Turmnoil, supra note 89, at 134-35.
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The writs of certiorari and error were available to all litigants--certiorari
before and error after final judgment, but brought only the record of the
proceedings below before the appellate court.102 Matters outside the record,
such as jury verdicts, were not within the scope of the writs.10 3 Since New
York did not use the Pennsylvania bill of exceptions, the record that came up
from a trial court on a writ of error was extremely thin, in most cases
containing "no more than a writ directing a court officer to serve process, a
declaration or formulary statement of the plaintiff's claim, a defendant's
general denial, and an inscrutable jury verdict." 104 Even when there was a
demurrer to the evidence, the record usually did not indicate the evidence to
which the demurrant was objecting.' 05 The real matter in dispute and the
evidence with which to resolve it were kept hidden from the appellate bench.
Thus, while a judge on the ground who presided over a trial would have known
in rich detail what the case was about and would have possessed the
information necessary to a fair judgment and the power to impose one,
transmission of the record did not give similar power to appellate judges,
especially the ultimate ones-first, the Governor and Council and second, the
Privy Council. 10 6
Two colonial governors tried to solve the problem that the limitations of
the common law record placed on their power. Both William Cosby and
Cadwallader Golden failed when their efforts resulted instead in two of the
great constitutional cases of the eighteenth century.
When an opposition newspaper, the New York Weekly Journal, began
publishing vehement denunciations of his administration, Cosby decided to
prosecute the printer of the Journal, John Peter Zenger, for seditious libel in
the Supreme Court, which was the colony's highest court with criminal
jurisdiction. 10 7 For Cosby to succeed, however, it was necessary to circumvent
ordinary criminal processes, in particular the power of the jury.
Cosby began effectively enough by having Zenger arrested on a special
warrant of the Governor's Council rather than by ordinary legal process.'108 He
next tried to induce a grand jury to indict Zenger, but it refused and Cosby had
to proceed by having the Attorney General file an information, "generally
02I.at 135.
'0'Id. at 15 1.
105 See id.
106 Id
107 See generally Stanley Nider Katz, Introduction to JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF
NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER: PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK
WEEKLY JOURNAL 1-35 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1963) [hereinafter Katz, Introduction].
18I.at 16-17.
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regarded as a high-handed, unfair procedure which undercut the popular basis
of the jury system."' 09 Still, the petit jury remained; how could Cosby and his
minions circumvent it?
Their technique was to have the Attorney General argue that the jury had
power only to return a verdict on the narrow question whether Zenger had
actually published the allegedly libelous words-a fact that Zenger
conceded. 110 Whether the words amounted to libel was, according to the
Attorney General, a question of law solely for the court.1I11 On the other side,
Andrew Hamilton, Zenger's lawyer, argued that the jury should return a
general verdict of not guilty.112 Chief Justice James DeLancey, pressured by
the Governor, but loyal to the profession and holding tenure during good
behavior, equivocated, declining to use his power to control the jury. He
instructed the jury that "as [the] facts or words in the information are confessed
the only thing that can come before you is whether the words as set forth in the
information make a libel. And that is a matter of law, no doubt which you may
leave to the court." 113 Note the use of the word "may," rather than "must."
DeLancey also read from a charge in an earlier English libel case in which a
jury had been instructed "to consider whether the words tended to beget an ill
opinion of the government."1 14 As the Chief Justice thus had left it open for
them to do, the jurors accepted Hamilton's argument, decided the law in
Zenger's favor, and returned a general verdict of not guilty."15
New Yorkers cheered the jury's verdict as a great victory for liberty, and
much of the Anglo-American world reacted noisily to the news. 116 And, to
ensure that that world understood what the Zenger victory was about, James
Alexander, one of Zenger's lawyers, in 1736 published the proceedings of the
case in A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger."17
The main thrust of Alexander's narrative, which summarized all the
arguments in the case but focused on Andrew Hamilton's, was that freedom of
the press was the primary bulwark of a free society and truth a defense to any
19I.at 19.
I 0I.at 22-23.
11 Id
12I.at 22.
113 See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 92, at 666 (quoting Chief Justice Debancy's
charge in King v. Zenger) (emphasis added).
114 See id at 666.
115 Katz, Introduction, supra note 107, at 22.
116 See id at 26-28.
117 See id
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libel prosecution."18 But Hamilton's second main point concerned the power
of the jury. Hamilton "insist[ed] that where matter of law [was] complicated
with matter of fact, the jury" had "at least as good a right" in a seditious libel
case as in any other "to determine both."" 9 He urged
that in all general issues, as upon non ciii. in trespass, non tort., nul disseizen
in assize, etc., though it is matter of law whether the defendant is a trespasser,
a disseizer, etc. . .. yet the jury . .. find for the plaint iff or defendant upon the
issue to be tried, wherein they resolve both law and fact complicately. 2 0
Hamilton explained that jurors were entitled to a different opinion than the
court because one man could not "see with another's eye, nor hear by
another's ear, no more [could] a man conclude or infer the thing by another's
understanding or reasoning."121 He therefore found it "very plain that the jury
are by law at liberty ... to find both the law and the fact" in all cases
submitted for their verdict. 12 2 The Chief Justice implicitly agreed when he sent
the jurors out to deliberate upon the case even though the only issue that the
Attorney General thought they should decide-the fact of publication-had
been conceded by the defense.'12 3
The Zenger case was not a precedent in the sense of binding subsequent
courts to follow what it had done. The case did not establish, as a matter of
law, that truth was a defense. But it cast doubt upon what had been largely
accepted doctrine in New York until that time-that juries decided the facts,
and judges, the law. By virtue of the publicity it received, the Zenger case
made the politically conscious class-the men, that is, who would sit on
juries-aware of their power to determine law as well as fact, and thereby
made the agents of the Crown aware of the difficulty of circumventing the
jury's, and hence the people's, opinions on the law. 124
118 See JAmES ALExANDER, A BRIEF NARRATivE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN
PETER ZENGER: PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 91-92 (Stanley N. Katz ed.,
1963).
19I.at 91.
10I.at 9 1-92.
121 Id at 92.
123 See id at 100.
124 See Katz, Introduction, supra note 107, at 30. It is important to note that Andrew
Hamilton did not treat juries in seditious libel cases differently than any other juries; in his
argument, they all had power to determine law along with fact. Conferring such power only
on libel juries and not others was a late eighteenth and early nineteenth century idea, not a
mid-eighteenth century one. For an example of an early nineteenth century view, see the
discussion of People v. Croswell, in 1 THE LAW PRACTIE OF ALEXANDER HAMLTON:
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Three decades later Cadwallader Golden, who was acting Governor at the
time, nonetheless tried circumvention. He had a new argument, applicable at
least in civil cases. He tested it in another of the eighteenth century's great
constitutional cases, Forsey v. Cunningham. 12 5
The case arose when Cunningham, in what had appearances of a
premeditated attack, stabbed Forsey in the chest with a sword he had concealed
beneath his clothing.'126 Forsey commenced a civil action in the Supreme Court
for battery, and in October 1764 the jury returned an astronomically large
verdict of £1,500 in the plaintiffs favor. 127 Cunningham determined to appeal
to the Governor and Council and ultimately, if necessary, to the Privy
Council.' 28 Golden, who was acting Governor at the time, was eager to
consider the appeal as a means of limiting the power of juries and thereby
enhancing that of the Crown.'12 9
The difficulty for Cunningham and Golden was that no error appeared on
the face of the record. The proceedings below had been legally simple: Forsey
had filed his writ and declaration, Cunningham had properly pleaded the
general issue and moved for a struck jury, which motion had been granted, and
the case had been submitted to the jury on the evidence, not reported in the
record, which the parties had presented.130 Cunningham's only objection was
to the size of the verdict, but if he took his appeal by writ of error, that
objection could not be raised. 1 3 1 There simply was no error in the proceedings
below.
Cunningham accordingly sought to proceed by filing an appeal rather than
a writ of error.132 The distinction was that on a writ of error, where a general
verdict had been given, the merits of a case did not appear in the record and
thus could not be considered by the higher court, only whether an issue of law
had been improperly decided below.' 33 On an appeal, in contrast, the entire
case was open to reconsideration, both on the evidence below and on such new
DocumErN-s AND COMMENTARY 775, 836-48 (Julius Goeble Jr. ed., 1964).
125 The case is most thoroughly analyzed in JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS To THE
PRIVY COUNciL, FROM THE AMERicAN PLANTATIONS 390-416 (1950). The following
discussion is based entirely upon Smith's analysis.
16I.at 390.
128 Id at 39 1-92, 395-96.
19I.at 393.
130 Id. at 390-9 1.
131 SMITH, supra note 125, at 391-92.
12I.at 393.
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evidence as the litigants might present.134 Golden conceded that under prior
New York practice no one had ever proceeded by this form of appeal from the
Supreme Court to the Governor and Council, but he saw Cunningham's case as
a device to alter this preexisting practice and thereby enhance the Crown's
power to reexamine jury verdicts contrary to royal policies. 135 Golden sought
to allow an appeal on the technical argument that a clause in the instructions of
the governor specifying the writ of error as the proper mode of appeal had been
omitted from those instructions in 1753.136
Relying on its precedents and on its understanding that, at common law in
England, cases proceeded from lower to higher courts only by writ of error, the
lawyer-dominated Supreme Court denied Cunningham's appeal.137 The
Council, on the advice of the judges and the Attorney General, agreed and also
denied the appeal, over Colden's dissent.138 In 1765, Cunningham next sought
leave to appeal from the Privy Council.13 9 The Council denied leave to appeal
to it, but at the same time directed Colden to allow an appeal from the Supreme
Court to the Court of Appeal, presumably the Governor and Council, in New
York. 140 Golden thereupon issued a writ of appeal to the Supreme Court. 141
That court, however, declined to obey the writ on the grounds that the attorney
seeking to appeal had not been properly retained, that it had no power to assign
counsel to proceed in a court over which it lacked jurisdiction, and that, in any
event, it had received no proper writ directing it to send up the record. 142 There
matters rested until November 1765, when a new governor arrived with new
instructions restoring the language omitted from the 1753 instructions and
confining appeals to the Governor and Council to "cases of error only." 143
Forsey v. Cunningham "shook the province and had repercussions the
whole length of the Atlantic seaboard."'44 It resulted in petitions to Parliament
and in the publication of a pamphlet, similar to Alexander's Brief Narrative in
136 I.at 393-95. Colden's position raised two issues: First, had the language been
omitted to change practice or only because it was superfluous? Second, could the common
law of a province be altered merely by a change in the Governor's instructions?
137 SMITH, supra note 125, at 394-95.
138 Id. at 405.
139 Id. at 406.
140 Id. at 408.
14 1 Id. at4l10.
12I.at 410-1l1.
143 SMITH, supra note 125, at 390.
144Id at 4 10.
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the Zenger case, that circulated widely.'145 Also, it left jurors with power to
determine law as well as fact unless a trial judge, in the exercise of his
unreviewable discretion, tried to use one of the procedural mechanisms at his
command to stop them. If he declined to do so, no appellate court, not even the
Governor or the Privy Council, subsequently could.
The result was that power was radically dispersed in New York. Law was
not what the Governor or even the Assembly by statute commanded; law was
what local people, either jurors or trial judges beholden to local constituencies,
or in the case of Supreme Court justices, to the bar, declared the law to be.
V. THE CAROLINAS
Let me end very briefly with the Carolinas. In South Carolina, judges
subjected juries to tight control, monitoring even factfinding.146 Thus, if a jury
either failed to consider evidence or ruled on the basis of improper evidence,
its verdict would be set aside and a new trial granted.'14 7
Judges . .. also totally controlled the potential power of juries to find law.
Often, juries cooperated by returning special verdicts that resolved only issues
of fact and left the court free to determine the legal significance of those facts.
But, even when juries tried to exercise greater freedom, judges kept them
under tight control. As early as 1734, a motion was made in arrest ofjudgment
on the ground that a jury had failed to address all the issues presented by the
pleadings. Judges also appear to have kept rein over evidence that a jury could
hear, permitting the introduction only of evidence relevant to the issues raised
by the pleadings. And, the Court of Common Pleas granted motions for new
trials when verdicts were "against Evidence[,] Contrary to Law, and the
Directions of the Court" or damages were excessive. In one case, the court
even set aside the verdict and granted judgment on the law for a defendant. 148
The Court of Common Pleas was subject, in turn, to firm supervision by
the Court of Chancery, which was put on an explicit statutory footing in 1721
with the governor of the colony himself sitting as presiding officer.' 49
145 See MICHAEL KAmmEN, COLONIAL NEW YORK: A HISTORY 350.(1975); SMITH,
supra note 125, at 390 n. 179.
146 William E. Nelson, The Height of Sophistication: Law and Professionalism in the
City-State of Charleston, South Carolina, 1670-1775, 61 S.C. L. REV. 1, 35 (2009)
[hereinafter Nelson, Height of Sophistication).
17I.at 36.
18I.at 36-37 (quoting Hazzard v. Wood, (S.C. Ct. Corn. Pl. 1761), microformed
on S.C. Ct. Corn. P1. Civil Journals, 1754-69 (S.C. Dep't of Archives & History)).
149 SeJAMES NELSON FRIERsoN, Legal Introduction to RECORDS OF THE COURT OF
02320101
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Chancery exercised an intrusive jurisdiction:'15 0 in the end, as one lawyer
argued, "the Court of Chancery ... had a Concurrent Jurisdiction in many
cases with the Court of Law,"' 51 although Chancery would not require a
respondent to answer to a claim that might subject him to a penalty at common
law,' 52 nor would it issue an injunction ex parte or in the absence of
seasonable notice to the respondent.'153
The result was a legal order under the tight control of the bench. It was,
moreover, a completely centralized system. There had been proposals in the
1 720s to establish courts to hear civil cases outside Charleston, but in 1729 the
Privy Council disallowed revised legislation creating them, and, as a result, the
Court of Common Pleas in Charleston remained the only court in the colony
with jurisdiction over civil, common law adjudication until the 1 770s. 154
Individual justices of the peace heard misdemeanors not requiring jury trial
and petty debt cases, but the justices never met together as county Courts of
Sessions; the only Sessions court sat in Charleston. 15 5 Outlying regions did not
even have their own sheriffs; one provost marshal for the entire colony served
CHANCERY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1671-1 779, at 53 (Anne King Gregorie ed., 1950); An Act
for Establishing a Court of Chancery in this His Majesty's Province of South Carolina (Sept.
9, 1721), in 1 THE EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1692-1734, at 437-39
(John D. Cushing ed., 1978) [hereinafter EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS] .
15 0 See Nelson, The Height of Sophistication, supra note 146, at 38-39.
151 Dering v. Elliott (S.C. Ch. 1772), in RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, 167 1-1779, at 602-03 (1950) (argument of counsel).
15 2 See Baker v. Moore (S.C. Ch. 1726), in RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1671-1 779, at 326 (1950).
153 See Trott V. Parris (S.C. Ch. 1735), in RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1671-1779, at 377-78 (1950). For the legislation and court rules
requiring notice, see Order of Sept. 8 (S.C. Ch. 1762), in RECORDS OF THE COURT OF
CHANCERY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1671-1779, at 512-13 (1950); FRIERSON, supra note 149,
at 54 (discussing legislation and court rules requiring notice).
154 See M. EUGENE SIRMANS, COLONIAkL SOUTH CAROLINA: A POLITICAL HISTORY,
1663-1763, at 142-44, 159-60, 166 (1966); see also Repeal of the Act for Settling the
Courts of Justice (Mar. 11, 1726), in EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS, supra note 149, at 540
(disallowed fees for courts located outside of Charleston). Of course, the Privy Council
heard appeals from civil judgments as well as passing on legislation. See, e.g., Ogilvie v.
Ward (S.C. Ch. 1774), in RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
167 1-1779, at 625 (1950). Prior to 1720, appeals had lay to the proprietors. See FRIERSON,
supra note 149, at 12.
155 SeWILLIAM SIMSON, THEf PRACTICAL JUSTICE AND PARISH-OFFICER, OF HIS
MAJESTY'S PROVINCE OF SOUm' CAROLINA 67-70, 124, 126-27 (photo reprint 1972)
(176 1); SHURMANS, supra note 154, at 25 1; An Act for the Speedy Recovery of Small Debts
(Sept. 2, 1721), amended by An Additional Act to an Act for the Trial of Small and Mean
Cases (Mar. 11, 1726), in EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS, supra note 149, at 424-25, 533-34.
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all writs and executed all judgments;' 56 and local constables were appointed
by the chief justice of the colony and his associate judges sitting in the colony-
wide courts in Charleston.'157
In short, South Carolina judges decided law, and juries only matters of
fact. Nonetheless, judges could not enforce their law beyond a small zone
surrounding the capital in which they sat; no courts existed outside Charleston,
the colony's capital, prior to 1772.158 The colony was a small city-state tightly
controlled by an alliance of planters, merchants, royal officials, and lawyers,
who all resided in Charleston, knew each other well, and profited collectively
from the colony's vast wealth. 159 A few hundred men dominated their women
and children as well as lower class whites economically dependent on them,
and they brutalized the colony's majority, its African-American slaves.' 60 But
they made no effort to impose law on outlying localities.'16 1
In North Carolina, as in South Carolina, the judiciary controlled jury
lawfinding.' 62 Thus, courts sustained demurrers to declarations, arrested
judgments, set aside jury verdicts, and reserved judgment whether particular
testimony was properly admitted in evidence and whether it was sufficient as a
matter of law to support a verdict.' 63 At other times, juries were willing to
leave important issues of law to the court by returning special verdicts.'164 And,
in one criminal case a court dismissed a prosecution after concluding that the
evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict, while in another
prosecution there was a motion in arrest of judgment following a jury verdict
of guilty of a lesser crime than the one charged.'165
But, as in South Carolina, the North Carolina Supreme Court proved
unable to enforce the law beyond in its bailiwick in the East. Trouble began in
the West as early as 1759, little more than a decade after significant settlement
156 See SIMPSON, supra note 155, at 112. For the relevant legislation, see An Act for
Establishing County and Precinct Courts (S.C. Ch. 1721), in EA.RLIEST PRINTE LAWS,
supra note 149, at 505, 516-17.
157 See SIMSON, supra note 155, at 84-85.
158 See Nelson, Height of Sophistication, supra note 146, at 37.
15 9 Id. at 44.
160 See id.
161 See id
161 See William E. Nelson, Politicizing the Courts and Undermining the Law: A Legal
History of Colonial North Carolina, 1660-1775, 88 N.C. L. R~v. 2133, 2171 (2010)
[hereinafter Nelson, Politicizing the Courts].
13I.at 2146-47.
164Id. at 2180.
11I.at 2184.
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had occurred in the region' 66 and only five years after the establishment of
Supreme Court jurisdiction there.' 67 Several vigilantes from Edgecombe
County seized a land agent in the Granville District who had been taking fees
that the vigilantes claimed were illegal.'168 A-fter forcing him to post an alleged
bond requiring a future appearance in court, the vigilantes dispersed, but, when
several of them were arrested and jailed, friends broke into the jail and
released them.'16 9 No further prosecutions transpired.'17 0
The next riot occurred in 1765, when a group of squatters in disguise
attacked and beat four surveyors who, on behalf of an absentee landowner,
were mapping out the land on which the squatters had settled.' 7' Governor
William Tryon issued a proclamation calling for the identification and
prosecution of the squatters, but nothing happened.' 72 In the same year, a
school teacher was sued for a small debt and responded by writing An Address
to the People of Granville County, in which he pilloried lawyers, court clerks,
and sheriffs and accused them of taking unlawful fees that increased the
charges of litigation.'73 His pamphlet led to a petition to the General
Assembly, but that petition was ignored.'17 4 "The next year, the January term of
the Rowan County Court for unstated reasons had to be postponed; all but two
theft prosecutions were continued to the April term."175
Enter the North Carolina Regulators.' 76 In 1767 people in the
Hillsborough vicinity had sought to create formal machinery by which protests
could be conveyed to the provincial government, but officials had blocked
their progress.'177 Then, at the beginning of April 1768 the people founded the
16 6 See HUGH TALMAGE LEFLER & ALB3ERT RAY NEWSOME, THE HISTORY OF A
SOUTHERN STATE: NORTH CAROLINA 78-8 1, 83-87 (3d ed. 1973); HARRY Roy MERRENs,
COLONILuNORTH CAROLINA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 53-60, 66 (1964).
167 An Act, for Establishing the Supreme Courts of Justice, Oyer and Terminer, and
General Gaol Delivery of North Carolina (Dec. 12, 1754), reprinted in 25 THE STATE
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 274 (Walter Clark, C.J. ed., 1906).
168 See WILLAM S. POWELL, NORTH CAROLINA THROUGH FOUR CENTURIES 150
(1989).
169 Id
170 Id.
173 Id. at 15 1.
17 POWELL, supra note 168, at 15 1.
17 Nelson, Politicizing the Courts, supra note 162, at 2190.
176 See generally PAUL DAVID NELSON, WILLIAM TRYON AND THE COURSE OF EMPIRE:
A LIFE IN BRITIH IMPERIAL SERVICE 70-89 (1990).
177 Id. at 7 1.
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Regulator Association with the goal of "regulating" their own affairs. 17 8 A few
days later a Regulator refuised to pay taxes, to which the sheriff responded by
seizing his horse and preparing to sell it.17 9 Fellow Regulators promptly tied
up the sheriff, rescued the horse, and threatened a prominent local judge.' 80
The judge called up the local militia, but when few responded to his call, he
sought help from Governor Tryon.18 1
In July, Tryon marched into Hillsborough at the head of a militia force
from three counties, but the Regulators made it plain they still intended not to
pay taxes. 182 By September the Regulators had assembled a force of some 800
men to disrupt the forthcoming Hillsborough sitting of the Supreme Court, but
Tryon had twice that number. 183 Ultimately the Regulators simply went home,
and the Court met. 184
Agitation continued for the next two years, but without violence. Then in
September 1770, the Regulators burst into the Hillsborough Supreme Court
session, seized and beat a lawyer, dragged the assistant Attorney General and
one of the judges into the street, and demolished the judge's house.' 85 Other
leading citizens, including the presiding judge, fled town. 186
The colony's legislature responded by enacting a statute permitting the
Attorney General to obtain indictments against and prosecute rioters in any
Supreme Court in the colony or in a specially convened court.187 This
legislation meant that, if Regulators could be captured, they could not count on
protection from local juries or on being rescued by local friends-precisely the
sort of allegedly unconstitutional deprivation of the right to trial by jury that
would worry Anti-federalists a mere two decades later.
Next, Tryon attempted to catch them. In the spring of 177-1, he gathered an
army to bring the West to its knees, and on May 16, 1771, Tryon's force of
181Id. at 71.
182 PAUL DAVID NELSON, supra note 176, at 73-75.
183 Id
184Id.
185 Id. at 75-78.
187 See An Act for Preventing Tumultuous and Riotous Assemblies, and for the More
Speedy and Effectually Punishing the Rioters, and for Restoring and Preserving the Public
Peace of this Province (Dec. 5, 1770), reprinted in 25 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH
CAROLINA, supra note 167, at 51 9a-5 19b.
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1,300 militiamen defeated 2,500 Regulators in the Battle of the Alamance. 188
He pardoned all but a handful of leaders and spent the next two months
chasing after the leaders and seizing their property.'18 9
In the view of the leading scholar of the Regulator war, Tryon "restore[d]
the western counties of North Carolina to a semblance of the king's peace."'19 0
But he did not restore the rule of law. According to extant colonial court
records, the Salisbury Supreme Court never met after 1770, and the
Hillsborough Court met only briefly in March and September of 1772, and no
one performed important governmental functions in the western counties, such
as collecting taxes.191 "Indeed, conditions were so bad in Rowan County as
early as 1769 that the man chosen as sheriff could not obtain a performance
bond, not because anyone doubted his integrity or honesty, but because" the
confused and disturbed state of the county prevented anyone from performing
the job.'92 "Two years later, Regulators were still refusing to take the oath of
allegiance in support of the colony's government." 193
In sum, Tryon's victory at Alamance established no more than the fact that
an army with superior weapons, at least in a pitched battle, could capture and
kill some of its enemies. But when the bulk of the enemies simply disappeared
into the countryside, the army could not govern them. Only the people could
govern themselves, and when the judiciary was unwilling to seek their
cooperation through the institution of the jury, government in colonial North
Carolina could not function.
VI. CONCLUSION
So what is the final score? On the issue of the lawflnding power of
colonial juries, the score is roughly tied with my research not yet completed:
juries possessed ultimate power over the law in New England and Virginia, but
not in the Carolinas, New York, and Pennsylvania. On the more important
issue of the power of localities to resist centrally imposed law, however, the
localities have a big lead. Although trial judges in New York were able to
control juries, the judges themselves were under the sway of local
constituencies, with the result that each county in the colony was a kind of
polity unto itself. Central courts in the Carolinas also controlled juries, but
without the aid of independent jurors outside their immediate bailiwicks, they
188 PAUL DAVID NELSON, supra note 176, at 81-85.
189 Id
10I.at 85.
191 See Nelson, Politicizing the Courts, supra note 162, at 2193.
12I.at 2194.
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proved either unwilling or unable to impose law on the hinterlands. Only
Pennsylvania was a clear outlier during the colonial period, and when the
Revolutionary conflict transferred lawfinding power there from courts to
juries, even Pennsylvania fell into line.
Accordingly, I am somewhat confident in concluding that in the years of
America's Founding-from the late 1770s into the early 1790s-locaities,
often though not always through the mechanism of jury lawflnding, typically
possessed the capacity to resist the imposition of central government law. But,
at the same time, it seenms clear that the Constitution of 1787, as its framers
intended it to do, created a national government that gradually gained
increasing power to impose national law on its recalcitrant peripheries. The
story of that government and its power, however, is one for another time and
place. So, for me at least, is a central issue raised by this symposium: whether
American courts today should be governed by the law as it existed and was
known to those who adopted the Constitution in 1787-1791 or, in the
alternative, by the logic of the Constitution's commitment to the enforceability
of national law, as that commitment was put into practice in the decades
immediately following the Constitution's adoption.'19 4
194 For my understanding of how the logic of the Constitution's commitment to the
enforceability of national law quickly played itself out, see William E. Nelson, Province of
the Judiciary, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325 (2004).
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